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On Conflict of Human Rights
XIAOBING XU*
GEORGE WILSON**
I. WHAT IS CONFLICT OF HUMAN RIGHTS?
For a striking example of conflict of human rights (CHR), one might
recall the climactic scene portrayed in the Oscar-winning movie Titanic: in
one dark, tragic night, the S.S. Titanic struck an iceberg, broke into two
parts and sank into the cold sea.  Hundreds of passengers struggled in the
icy water, crying for help.  A number of already-launched lifeboats refused
to come to their assistance.  Instead, the lifeboats stayed at a distance,
watching and waiting until the sea became quiet again. Then, at the conclu-
sion of the scene, one lifeboat came and saved perhaps the only survivor,
the lead actress.  This outcome seems inhuman and cruel, but it was rea-
sonable: if the lifeboats had come to help from the beginning, there would
have been the real danger that the desperate people in the water might have
caused the boats to capsize and sink, and those aboard would have died
too.  Obviously, in such a situation (the number of lifeboats was limited),
the rights to life of those in lifeboats and of those in the sea were in con-
flict, as the movie vividly demonstrated.  The result was that the right to
life of those in lifeboats (mostly women and children) prevailed over that
of the people floundering in the sea.
Of course, not every CHR is so tragic.  Many conflicts of human rights
(CHRs) occur in daily life.  For instance, worldwide, numerous abortions
are performed quietly.  To many, abortion involves the serious conflict
between a fetus’ right to life and a woman’s right to choose to have an
abortion.  Such a conflict is extremely controversial and is governed by
national laws and regulations.  Consider the 2002 regulations issued by the
National Population and Family Planning Commission of China, which
prohibit ultrasound scans to determine the sex of a fetus, and authorize
monetary and non-monetary punishments for sex-selection abortions.1
 * Professor, School of Law, Shanghai Jiaotong University.  The author wishes to thank Professor
Henry Steiner for all his encouragement as well as his perceptive comments on the early draft of this
article.  Special thanks go to the Ford Foundation for providing the financial support for my stay during
1992-1993 at Harvard Law School, where this research began.
 ** Reference Librarian, Stanford Law School, Robert Crown Law Library.
 1. The Chinese version of the law is available at National Population and Family Planning Com-
mission of China, http://www.chinapop.gov.cn/fzjw/flfg/t20040326_1895.htm (last visited Nov. 6,
2006).
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China is also reported as considering formally criminalizing sex-selection
abortions.2
The above examples indicate that while new CHRs develop as human
society progresses, old CHRs, such as the S.S. Titanic tragedy, may repeat
themselves from time to time.  The historical method of quarantine, used
when epidemic illnesses erupt, is another example.3  During 2002 and
2003, the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) epidemic spread from
China into a number of countries and regions.  The world responded with
quarantines—restraining the movement of people—to control the spread of
infectious disease.  There was a conflict between the freedom of those who
had contacts with SARS patients (as well as those who were misdiagnosed
as SARS patients)4 and the interests of public health and public safety (in-
cluding the right to life and health of others); the rights of the former were
constrained.5
They also demonstrate that although CHRs may be settled by the par-
ties involved in the conflict themselves (for example, if a lifeboat is over-
loaded and in danger of sinking, those already in the boat can act to pre-
vent more people from getting on it),6 more often CHRs are resolved by a
third party acting as a “judge.”  Third parties can be state organs, or public
or private institutions or individuals with special social responsibilities
such as hospitals, doctors, lifeguards, etc.  State organs may enact laws and
regulations (legislatures) or act on their public authorities (administrative
and judicial organs)7 to resolve CHRs.  In addition, public or private insti-
tutions and individuals may resolve CHRs in fulfilling their responsibili-
ties, according to state laws and regulations as well as professional rules
and judgments.
 2. See  Sherry F. Colb, China Announces That It Will Criminalize Sex-Selection Abortions,
FINDLAW’S WRIT, Jan. 26, 2005, available at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20050126.html.
 3. See James S. Bromberg & Charles Vidich, 21st Century Role for Quarantines, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
9, 2003, § 2, at 13.
 4. See Hundreds of SARS Cases Misdiagnosed in China’s Guangdong Province, AGENCY FRANCE
PRESSE, Oct. 27, 2003.
 5. See, e.g., Standards of Identifying People Having Close Contact with SARS Patients and Han-
dling Principles (Trial Implementation) (promulgated by the Ministry of Health, May 8, 2003), avail-
able at http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/PI-c/434396.htm.
 6. There may also be either heroic or immoral deeds that occur in a conflict situation.  For exam-
ple, in the movie Titanic, the lead actor provides his lover, the lead actress, the opportunity to survive,
while her fiancé bribes his way onto a lifeboat, even though the priority was to restrict the lifeboats to
women and children.
 7. The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has dealt with a number of CHR cases where
European countries imposed limitations on certain human rights in order to protect other conflicting
human rights.  When handling these cases, the ECHR balances the relevant values of the conflicting
human rights.  See Larry Catá Backer, Disciplining Judicial Interpretation of Fundamental Rights:
First Amendment Decadence in Southworth and Boy Scouts of America and European Alternatives, 36
TULSA L.J. 117, 147 (2000).
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The “judge” (especially state organs) often plays a pivotal role in re-
solving CHRs, especially those CHRs that lead to deep social controversy
and attract strong social interference.  For example, in regard to issues of
euthanasia, abortion and the conflict between religious rights and duties of
Islamic women in some Islamic countries and rights and duties of women
provided in international human rights conventions, rights-holders in those
CHRs no longer have the freedom to make their own decisions.  They must
accept the consequences of state and social interference, choose to evade
state laws and pursue abortion and euthanasia in places where it is legal or
else go into exile—as have some Islamic women who advocate for
women’s rights.
On the other hand, third-party or social interference may not only play
a pivotal role in resolving CHRs, but also may often be the reason or con-
dition for the existence of some CHRs.  For example, in the Titanic trag-
edy, if there had been no possibility of saving lives, there would have been
no CHRs among the passengers.  It is exactly because third party assis-
tance exists, and the third party determines how to help, that CHRs may
occur.
It should be pointed out that in addition to “judges,” everyone else in a
society may form his/her own standards as to CHRs.  Many CHRs may not
lead to significant social controversies—such as the quarantines adopted
during the 2002-2003 SARS epidemic, which did not prompt any serious
dispute.  Some CHRs (such as issues of abortion rights and euthanasia),
however, not only cause great division of societies and racial groups as a
whole, but also may lead the same CHR to different or even opposite re-
sults in different states or in different regions in one state (for example, in
the United States, only the State of Oregon has legalized euthanasia);
hence, the result that CHRs may diverge in different times and places.8
CHR is a fundamental theoretical issue of human rights.  Rex Martin
once pointed out that if the CHR issue is left unresolved, the status of lib-
eral theorist John Rawls’ “basic rights as forming a stable system made up
of mutually compatible elements” is uncertain.9  Therefore, no serious hu-
man rights theory may ignore the CHR issue.  On the other hand, CHR is
also a difficult theoretical issue because, as indicated, CHR may cause
serious division within a society or a racial group and may lead to different
solutions and results at different times and places.  To some scholars,
CHRs can even be inherently intractable and thus regarded as a major ob-
 8. The conflicting rights may lead to conflicting human rights rulings by courts and engender
forum shopping.  See Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 285,
335-40 (1999).
 9. See REX MARTIN, RAWLS AND RIGHTS 129 (1985).
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stacle to the universality of human rights.10  Is CHR a real obstacle to the
universality of human rights?  How should one interpret the controversial
CHR phenomenon and explain the divergence of CHR results?  And, over-
all, why it is useful to look at CHR issues?  To try to answer these ques-
tions, we must first know more about CHR.
A.  The CHR Concept
For the purposes of this article, CHR is simply defined as a clash be-
tween same or different human right/s, which is/are held by the same or
different rights-holder/s. Hence, CHR may arise in variable occasions,
depending on what human right/s is/are in conflict and by whom held.  In
other words, CHR may occur between different human rights; between two
instances of the same right; between different rights-holders; and, in some
special circumstances, one rights-holder may face two conflicting human
rights.
An easy example is when two persons’ lives are in danger but only one
person’s life can be saved due to a lack of available medical or other fa-
cilities.  There will be an immediate conflict between their respective rights
to life: the same right held by two rights-holders conflicts.11  Another ex-
ample occurs during a famine, when one person’s property right may con-
flict with another person’s (or a group of persons’) right to life, such that
the former’s stored grain, for example, may be commandeered: different
human rights held by different rights-holders conflict.12  A third example
concerns the controversial issue of euthanasia, in that one’s own right to
life may conflict with his/her own right to die—and with society’s interfer-
ence with the latter right: one rights-holder faces two conflicting human
rights.13
Although the concept of CHR is not that complicated, in reality, many
cases of CHR are not easily identified.  One reason is that when we believe
one right has overwhelming importance, we usually overlook the fact that
there is another right conflicting with it.  For example, in 1981, New Zea-
 10. See Philip Alston, Human Rights in 1993: How Far Has the United Nations Come and Where
Should It Go From Here?, in WORLD CONFERENCE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, VIENNA, JUNE 1993: THE
CONTRIBUTION OF NGOS: REPORTS AND DOCUMENTS 13-22 (Manfred Nowak ed., 1994).
 11. The authors are indebted to Jeremy Waldron for this example.  See Jeremy Waldron, Rights in
Conflict, 99 ETHICS 503, 503-19 (1989).  Another example is the conflict between religious landlords
who refuse to rent their apartments to unmarried or gay/lesbian renters.  See Marie A. Failinger, Re-
membering Mrs. Murphy: A Remedies Approach to the Conflict Between Gay/Lesbian Renters and
Religious Landlords, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 383 (2001).
 12. See S. I. BENN & R. S. PETERS, SOCIAL PRINCIPLES AND THE DEMOCRATIC STATE 96 (1959).
 13. For a discussion of euthanasia as a right, see JOEL FEINBERG, Voluntary Euthanasia and the
Inalienable Right to Life, in RIGHTS, JUSTICE, AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY 221-51 (1980).
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land was criticized internationally, especially by black African countries,
and buffeted by internal strife, over a series of rugby matches to be played
between a select South African team (the Springboks) and a select New
Zealand team (the All Blacks).  Although there was one black player on the
South African team, he was widely regarded as a mere token, and the team
was perceived to be constituted on racially invidious grounds and repre-
sentative of an apartheid country that deserved censure.  The New Zealand
government nevertheless justified its policy to allow the matches by citing
the overriding importance of one consideration, namely, the policy of al-
lowing all sports events as part of the right of free association.14
Clearly, the purpose of the international isolation of South Africa at
that time was to help black people gain equal rights with white people in
South Africa and to abolish apartheid at an earlier date.  The resolutions
adopted by the United Nations to sanction South Africa showed that black
people’s equal rights in South Africa were overwhelmingly important to
the international community.  However, the New Zealand government in-
sisted that even for that purpose, the “right of free association” of the ath-
letes from the two countries should not be sacrificed.  Such a CHR was
hardly recognized by the international community, especially by other
(black) African nations.  Even had they recognized it, they would arguably
still have enforced the United Nations’ sanctions and insisted that the equal
rights of black people in South Africa overrode the “right of free associa-
tion” of the athletes.
Another reason for difficulty in identifying cases of CHR may be that
conflicting human rights are implied within more general, non-human-
rights normative values. For example, during the two Gulf Wars, the
United States has restrained the freedom of the press, citing the considera-
tion of national security.  The American public in general has understood
that this is the consequence of the fact that the national security interest
overrides the freedom of the press, not the consequence of a CHR.  But, in
fact, the national security consideration should contain notions of every
American’s (including every American soldier’s) right to life or safety as
well as be based on such individual rights.  Another example is that, due to
the burden of its population, China has long enforced a strict family plan-
ning program and restrained spouses’ reproduction rights.  According to
Article 1 of the Population and Family Planning Law of China,15 its aim is
to maintain harmony between population and socio-economic development
 14. The authors are indebted in this case to Rex Martin.  See MARTIN, supra note 9, at 145; see also
WIKIPEDIA, ALL BLACKS, http://www.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_Blacks (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
 15. An unofficial English translation of the law is available at United Nations Economic and Social
Commission for Asia and the Pacific, http://www.unescap.org/esid/psis/population/database/poplaws/
law_china/ch_record052.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2006).
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as well as to realize sustainable development.  Thus, on the surface, the
conflict is between human rights (spouses’ reproduction rights) and non-
human rights normative values (the sustainable development of the state
and society).  But the sustainable development of the state and society
should include the development of the social and economic rights of all of
us.16
In reality, conflicts between human rights and non-human rights nor-
mative values are commonplace.  In addition to the conflict between free-
dom of the press and national security interests in wartime, as well as the
conflict between reproduction rights and the sustainable development of
the state and society under China’s family planning program, other general
terms of the normative considerations—such as public safety, public order,
public health (e.g., the SARS epidemic), and public morality—may clash
frequently with human rights.  These conflicts have long been recognized
in international human rights instruments.  For example, Article 8(a) of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states:
(a) The right of everyone to form trade unions and join the trade
union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organization
concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and
social interests.  No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of
this right other than those prescribed by law and which are neces-
sary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or
public order or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others . . . .17
It should be pointed out that, except for the non-right normative values
recognized by international human rights instruments, which may out-
weigh human rights, it is a point of controversy whether other non-right
values may constrain human rights.  Thus, we cannot preclude the possi-
bility that they may outweigh human rights.  For instance, utilitarians al-
ways think that considerations of utility—such as public welfare, public
safety, public interest, and economic efficiency—can outweigh human
rights.  Rawls, however, believes that “basic rights can be overridden by
non-rights (e.g., the utilitarian considerations of general welfare, public
safety, etc.) only when such an overriding is required in order to preserve a
 16. Eugene Brody argues that the idea that reproduction may be a right involves “questions of dis-
tributive justice or equal access to life’s goods.  Thus, the presumed right of adults to have as many
children as they wish may violate the rights of others—of the ensuing progeny for maximum life
chances, or of other adults to share equally in scarce resources.”  See EUGENE B. BRODY, BIOMEDICAL
TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 36 (1993).
 17. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 8(a), Dec. 16, 1966, S.
EXEC. DOC. D, 95-2 (1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 4 (emphasis added); see also International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, arts. 19-22, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 172.
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system of rights in existence.”18  However, according to Rawls’ own judg-
ment, it is almost impossible for other normative values to constrain human
rights.19  Indeed, to Ronald Dworkin, the human rights system is a “trump”
over all other value systems.20  If human rights may be overridden by other
value systems, is it meaningful to set up a human rights system and to di-
vide normative values into categories of human rights and of non-human
rights?
As opposed to Rawls, who recognizes that it is possible that non-rights
may outweigh basic rights but insists that it only happens when it “is re-
quired in order to preserve a system of rights in existence,” Alan Gewirth
completely excludes the possibility of non-rights constraining human rights
except those general non-right values that may contain human rights ele-
ments.  He claims:
when a human right is overridden, it must be by another human
right, especially when the latter’s Object is more necessary for ac-
tion than the former’s.  Even when a right is overridden by consid-
erations of the general welfare, the latter criterion, to be genuinely
overriding, must be composed of the rights of individuals.  For ex-
ample, the national defense or even the rules of the road involve
the rights of individuals to security from attack and safety.21
This article supports Gewirth’s view: that is, the reason why utilitarian
values such as national security, public safety, public order, public health,
and public morality may outweigh human rights is that they contain human
rights elements.22  Thus, as a rule, whenever human rights clash with non-
rights value considerations, we should analyze whether they contain human
rights elements.  If they do, they may override human rights that conflict
with them.  If they do not, they cannot.
 18. MARTIN, supra note 9, at 153.
 19. Id. at 134.
 20. See Ronald Dworkin, Rights As Trumps, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 153-67 (Jeremy Waldron ed.,
1984) [hereinafter Dworkin I]; RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978) [hereinafter
DWORKIN II].
 21. See ALAN GEWIRTH, HUMAN RIGHTS: ESSAYS ON JUSTIFICATION AND APPLICATIONS 6 (1982)
(emphasis added).
 22. For Dworkin, there is no general right to liberty but, instead, the right to liberties.  It seems to
him “absurd to suppose that men and women have any general right to liberty at all.”  See DWORKIN II,
supra note 20, at 267.  Similarly, the authors would also argue that the notion of “general interest or
welfare” is also absurd and that “general interest or welfare” should be possible to divide into those
interests that have been characterized as rights and those interests that have been left as non-rights.
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B.  The Concept of Human Rights and CHR
The issue of the concept of human rights, or what rights humankind
possesses, has always been controversial.  Some scholars even believe that
discussion of the concept of human rights will inevitably produce “theo-
retical disagreements . . . [and] . . . can never be resolved into universally
agreed responses.”23  Thus, the first influence CHR has on the human
rights concept is that a CHR sometimes is exactly what blocks a consensus
on whether a right is a human right.  For example, the controversy over
whether a pregnant woman has a “human right to abortion,” or whether a
very old or chronically ill person has a “human right to die,” is typical.
Obviously, expanding human rights lists and subjects leads to an in-
crease in CHRs, as “[o]ccasions for conflict among rights multiply as
catalogs of rights grow longer.”24  Many are “worried about the prolifera-
tion of rights claims” and would rather limit any expansion of the human
rights list and, in turn, rights conflicts.25  For example, if one does not rec-
ognize social-economic rights as human rights, as Maurice Cranston
does,26 some instances of CHR would simply not exist.  To enforce family
planning programs would thus surely violate human rights.  On the other
hand, different outlooks as to who is entitled to be a rights-holder may also
affect the issue of CHR.  For instance, if only individuals can be rights-
holders, instances of CHR involving collective rights will be excluded.
The authors disagree with such a narrow-minded approach and believe
it is more meaningful to construct a broad concept of human rights based
on the totality of international human rights efforts in the United Nations,
including all United Nations human rights treaties and documents.  The
human rights concept is not static, but an evolving process,27 through
which different needs, goods, interests, and values will be gradually ac-
cepted and realized as human rights.28  Such a concept is broad enough to
 23. MICHAEL FREEDEN, RIGHTS 5-6 (1991).
 24. MARRY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 1 6
(1991).
 25. Waldron, supra note 11, at 507.
 26. Maurice Cranston, Human Rights, Real and Supposed, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMAN RIGHTS
121-28 (Morton E. Winston, ed., 1989).
 27. Thus, Donnelly is correct to say that “human rights are quite obviously historically specific, so
much so that in recent years it has become popular to speak of successive ‘generations’ of human
rights”; and, “[t]he evolution of particular conceptions or lists of human rights is seen in the construc-
tivist theory as the result of the reciprocal interaction of moral conceptions and material conditions of
life, mediated through social institutions such as rights.”  JACK DONNELLY, THE CONCEPT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 35 (1985).
 28. Indeed, to many, “leave with pay” is still a luxury in today’s world, not a basic human right.
However, as society and economy develop, who can be certain that leave with pay will not become a
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include not only traditional civil and political rights, but also economic,
social, and cultural rights, rights of special groups (such as women, chil-
dren, elders, the disabled, the mentally-ill, minorities, and indigenous peo-
ple), as well as the so-called “third generation rights,” such as the right to
development and the right to the environment.  In addition, human rights
can be either individual or collective.29
Undoubtedly, a paradox of this broad approach toward the concept of
human rights is that there may be more frequent occurrences of CHR and
an increasing uncertainty as to what values, interests, and needs are human
rights.30  However, a broad human rights concept reflects both the whole
picture of United Nations’ human rights activities and the future direction
of the international human rights movement.  The paradox represents a
reality that is neither avoidable nor can be eliminated by artificially adopt-
ing a narrow concept of human rights.
Thus, another influence of CHR on the human rights concept is that,
although some human rights theories claim that they can prevent all or
most cases of CHR from occurring, none may in fact eliminate the exis-
tence of CHRs.  According to Robert Nozick, rights are side-constraints,
namely, limits on a rights-holder’s actions.  Thus, if rights-holders act
within the limits, there will be no conflicts of rights.31  It seems what
Nozick defines is an ideal state of human rights development.  It does not
appear to have much practical meaning, as the process of human rights
development seems constant and endless.
It should be noted that CHR is essentially inherent to any comprehen-
sive human rights system for several reasons.  First, the establishment of a
human rights system is a historical process of gradual development and
perfection.  Whenever new human rights emerge or the scope of protection
of existing human rights expands, they may clash with established human
rights.  Second, even if new human rights no longer emerge, or the scope
of protection of existing human rights no longer expands, it is impossible
to eliminate all conflicts between existing human rights.  Not only may
similar CHRs repeat themselves, they may also lead to different solutions
and results, as they may occur at different times and places and as the sub-
jects of human rights change.  For example, we cannot expect the result of
the conflict between freedom of the press and the right to a fair trial or
basic human right?  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, S.
EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 172.  
 29. See, e.g., Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT’L COMP.
L.Q. 102 (1976).  For a more detailed discussion, see HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALIST WORLD:
INDIVIDUALS AND COLLECTIVES § 2 (Jan Berting et al. eds., 1990).
 30. See The Problems of Human Rights, in U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 98TH CONG., COUNTRY REPORTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1982, at 5 (1983).
 31. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 28-33, 238 (1974).
40 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 1
privacy to always be the same.32  Moreover, conflict may also occur be-
tween the same right claimed by different rights-holders.33  Thus, it is un-
likely that conflicts between established human rights will ever be elimi-
nated.34
II. CHR RESOLUTION METHODS AND UNCERTAINTY OF RESULTS
There have been many methods, principled or ad hoc, legal, or non-
legal, realistic or imaginative, in practice or in theory, for resolving CHRs.
No matter what methods we use to resolve CHRs, there are usually two
types of results: either one of the conflicting rights overrides the other, or a
compromise is reached between the conflicting rights.  A classic example
of the former is where the right to liberty conflicts with, and is temporarily
 32. A relatively recent example is that Colorado’s highest court ruled, albeit deeply divided by a
vote of four to three, that the judge in the rape trial of the basketball star Kobe Bryant was justified in
barring the news media from publishing court documents that the trial court itself had accidentally
released to the public.  The documents detailed the sex life of Mr. Bryant’s accuser.  The majority of
the court cited the privacy rights of the accuser and Bryant’s right to a fair trial as the reasons for the
ruling.  However, one legal scholar pointed out that the United States Supreme Court has consistently
concluded that once information gets out, whether by chance or happenstance, the news media cannot
be restrained from publishing it.  See Kirk Jognson, Ban on Printing Information on Kobe Bryant
Accuser Is Upheld, N.Y. TIMES,  July 20, 2004, at A12.  After the ruling of the Colorado Supreme
Court, the news organizations turned to the United States Supreme Court, filing an emergency applica-
tion with Justice Stephen Breyer.  Rather than rule directly on the validity of the Colorado restraint,
Justice Breyer asked the trial judge to clarify whether he planned to release the transcripts immediately
and to justify any redactions or edits if he released only part of them.  The trial judge eventually re-
leased the transcripts with only a few lines edited out.  The judge stated that after “careful consideration
of the competing interests” and a review of the orders of the courts, he was “compelled to release these
transcripts notwithstanding the concern that the release will compromise the rights of some of the
participants.”  See Associated Press, Kobe Transcripts Released, Aug. 2, 2004, available at
http://www.allstarz.hollywood.com/kobe/trial.htm.
 33. Feinberg calls it conflict between “rights of its own kind.”  See JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL
PHILOSOPHY 95-96 (1973).  Waldron calls it an “intraright,” as distinct from an “interright,” conflict.
See Waldron, supra note 11, at 513-14.  Martin calls it an “internal” conflict.  See REX MARTIN, A
SYSTEM OF RIGHTS 118-23 (1993).
 34. For example, in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Pentagon proposed in 2003
the largest surveillance program in United States’ history—the so-called Total Information Awareness
program, later changed due to widespread criticism into the Terrorism Information Awareness pro-
gram.  The Pentagon was to establish a computer surveillance system that could “put a spyglass on
Americans’ every move, from literally the way Americans move to their virtual moves, scanning shop-
ping, e-mail, bank deposits, vacations, medical prescriptions, academic grades and trips to the vet.”
The program was also to have a radar-based device that could identify people by the way they walk.
As the program appeared to threaten Americans’ privacy, Congress cut off the budget for it in adopting
the Pentagon’s spending plan for 2004.  Nevertheless, Congress did allow the National Foreign Intelli-
gence Program to use “processing, analysis and collaboration tools” developed under the Terrorism
Information Awareness program for foreign intelligence purposes.  Thus, in this conflict between
national security and people’s privacy, Americans were winners and foreign citizens losers.  See
Maureen Dowd, Walk This Way, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 2003, at A31; Carl Hulse, Congress Shuts
Pentagon Unit Over Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 26, 2003, at A20.  
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overridden by, the right to life when authorities decide “to quarantine
whole neighborhoods to prevent the spread of a plague.”35  A typical ex-
ample of the latter is when—in order to solve a conflict over freedom of
speech—each speaker’s time in a public debate is limited as a compromise.
Similarly, to solve the conflict between freedom of movement and freedom
of demonstration, although the authorities may not deprive people of the
right to demonstrate in the city, they may limit the time, place, and manner
of demonstration.36
And no matter what result a CHR may lead to, a difficult issue is that
the same CHR may produce a variety of results at different times and
places with different rights-holders.  For example, the result of the same
conflict between a fetus’ right to life and a woman’s right to abortion37
may be very different in different parts of the world.  Some countries, such
as largely Roman Catholic Ireland38 and Spain,39 generally prohibit abor-
tion; other countries permit abortion with major limitations (in the United
States, for example, abortion is generally allowed only within the first tri-
mester of pregnancy); yet others generally allow abortions with minor
limitations (in China, for example, only sex-selection abortion is illegal).40
This leads to the following observations: so far, on the one hand, there
is no single method that has been generally accepted among philosophers
and legal scholars and may be applied to all types of CHRs; on the other
hand, no effective method may ensure that similar CHRs may achieve uni-
form results.
A.  A Variety of CHR Resolution Methods
There are plenty of methods to resolve CHRs.  From the point of view
of judicial practice, Aharon Barak, Israeli Supreme Court President, has
divided them into two categories: one is principled balancing, the other is
 35. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 72.
 36. This case is quoted by Aharon Barak.  See Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: the Role of a
Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16, 96-97 (2002).
 37. In general, abortion supporters are called pro-choice while anti-abortion advocates are called
pro-life.
 38. Under Irish law, it is illegal for a woman to have an abortion unless there is a “real and substan-
tial” risk to her life.  See  SARAH CLEARY, IRELAND: ANTI-ABORTION REFERENDUM DEFEATED,
http://www.greenleft.org.au/2002/485/28581 (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
 39. Spanish abortion law is similar to that of Ireland.  See Jason Horowitz, Pope Warns Spain’s
Leader on Gay Rites and Abortion, INT’L HERALD TRIB., June 22, 2004.
 40. See China Bans Selective Abortion to Fix Imbalance, CHINA DAILY, July 16, 2004, available at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-07/16/content_349051.htm.  In the West, with recent
advances in reproductive technology, there have also been calls to limit parents’ selection of their
children’s sex and other characteristics.  See, e.g., Kelly M. Plummer, Comment, Ending Parents’
Unlimited Power to Choose: Legislation is Necessary to Prohibit Parents’ Selection of Their Chil-
dren’s Sex and Characteristics, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 517 (2003).
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ad hoc balancing.  The former may be applied in future cases while the
latter may not.41  This article is more concerned with principled methods.
In practice, some CHR resolution methods have long been customs.
For example, CHRs arising from material shortages may be resolved by
technical methods.42  If there are many patients waiting at the same time
for donated organs and the supply is limited, certain technical factors may
be used to determine their order of priority.  For example, according to the
rules of the United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) governing organ
matching and allocation, these factors include: blood type and size of the
organ(s) needed, time spent awaiting a transplant, the relative distance
between donor and recipient, the medical urgency of the recipient, whether
the recipient is a child or an adult, etc.43  However, such technical methods
do not work for most other CHRs.
International human rights treaties have provided various rules for
handling particular CHRs.  These rules are two types: those of human
rights restrictions and those of derogation.  The former is common to most
human rights treaties.  For example, Article 14(1) of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights stipulates that:
[t]he press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a
trial for reasons of morals, public order (ordre public) or national
security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private
lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in
the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity
would prejudice the interests of justice . . . .44
The derogation clauses are linked to one of the often-mentioned prin-
cipled methods, that is, a ranking system among human rights.  According
to this system, when a right of higher rank clashes with a right of lower
rank, the former prevails.  Indeed, once there were views taken by both the
West and the South arguing that either civil and political rights take pri-
macy over economic, social, and cultural rights, or vice versa.  Another
way of ranking rights is to divide human rights into absolute and non-
absolute rights.  When an absolute right clashes with a non-absolute right,
 41. See Barak, supra note 36, at 95.
 42. Martin mentions the use of technical procedural points by courts to resolve CHRs.  See MARTIN,
supra note 33, at 122.
 43. For the rules governing organ matching and allocation, visit the United Network for Organ
Sharing website at http://www.unos.org/.
 44. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 14, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E,
95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 176.  For provisions regarding human rights in international human rights
conventions and related cases, see RHONA K. M. SMITH, TEXTBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGHTS 38-52 (2003).
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the former prevails.45  For example, Article 4 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights stipulates:
1. In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the na-
tion and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States
Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating
from their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent
strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that
such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations un-
der international law and do not involve discrimination solely on
the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin.
2. No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15,
16 and 18 may be made under this provision.46
According to Article 4(2), right to life, freedom from torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, freedom from slavery and
servitude, freedom from guilt unless determined by law, right to recogni-
tion as a person before the law, and right to freedom of thought, con-
science, and religion are underogatable human rights, and thus become
“absolute” in international human rights law.47  Nevertheless, except provi-
sions in international human rights instruments, the efforts to establish a
ranking system to resolve CHRs have not been successful.48  Some of the
efforts, such as the claims for the primacy of civil and political rights over
economic, social, and cultural rights, sound more like downgrading or ex-
clusion of the latter.  As Professor Steiner has put it, “[i]n given contexts, a
priority can of course amount to exclusivity.”49
 45. For example, Gewirth argues that “certain rights can be shown to be absolute.”  GEWIRTH, supra
note 21, at 219; see generally id. at 218-33.
 46. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 19-22, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC.
E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 172.
 47. Id.  Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms pro-
vides similar underogatable human rights.  They include right to life, freedom from torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, freedom from slavery and servitude, and freedom from
guilt unless determined by law.  European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 17.
 48. Theodor Meron has observed that there is no accepted system by which higher rights can be
identified and their content determined.  See Theodor Meron, On a Hierarchy of International Human
Rights, 80 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 21-22 (1986).
 49. See Henry J. Steiner, The Youth of Rights, 104 HARV. L. REV. 917, 928 (1991).  Mary Robinson,
former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, has pointed out that:
 [D]ivisions and ranking of rights is artificial.  When President Roosevelt spoke of the fa-
mous “four freedoms,” freedom from want stood equally alongside freedom from fear.
Human rights will not be truly achieved until all accept economic, social and cultural rights
as rights that deserve and require equal attention to civil and political rights and freedoms.
This imperative was endorsed by over 170 states at the Vienna World Conference on Hu-
man Rights, 1993:  All human rights are universal, indivisible and interdependent and inter-
44 PIERCE LAW REVIEW Vol. 5, No. 1
Contrary to the above view that rights are unequal, J. L. Mackie argues
that all human rights are absolutely equal and, when they are in conflict,
mutual compromise with equal sacrifice should be made.  The following
comment is from his debate with R. M. Hare, who holds a utilitarian view
on human rights:
Conflicts between these prima facie rights might be handled by a
utilitarianism of rights, so that what would count as the ideally just
arrangement would be that in which total right-fulfillment was
maximized, or total right-infringement minimized.  Alternatively,
they might be handled by assuming that, ideally, one person’s
rights should not be infringed more than another’s.  Again the two
methods are not even extensionally equivalent, and again I suggest
that the second is the more attractive.  Such equality of sacrifice in
compromises between our Lochean rights is, of course, not
equivalent to the equal need-satisfaction in our second reading of
the Marxist slogan, precisely because our rights include each indi-
vidual’s private property in his own body, energy, talents, and la-
bor, and because each has a prima facie right to be free and to pur-
sue happiness in whatever way he chooses, doubtless with very
varying degrees of success.50
Mackie’s views that “one person’s rights should not be infringed more
than another’s” as well as “equality of sacrifice in compromises between
our Lochean rights” are obviously not proven by the reality of CHRs, as it
is widely accepted that one conflicting right may override another.  Mi-
chael Freeden has strongly opposed Mackie’s “compromise formula that
would, when conflicts among rights arise, infringe all people’s rights
equally and therefore dehumanize them all.  Not all equal treatment is ipso
facto fair treatment: a tyrant may boil all his subjects in oil.”51  Clearly, to
“treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same foot-
ing, and with the same emphasis” does not mean that all human rights have
absolute equal weight in all circumstances.  As mentioned above, interna-
tional human rights instruments emphasize that all rights are equally im-
related.  The international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal
manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis.
 Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Second Annual BP Lecture on
Human Rights and Global Civilisation (Nov. 29, 2001), http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/
 0/AFD931913249074EC1256B17002C27BF?opendocument.
 50. J. L. Mackie, Rights, Utility, and Universalization, in UTILITY AND RIGHTS 88-89 (R. G. Frey
ed., 1984) (emphasis added); see also R. M. Hare, Rights, Utility, and Universalization: Reply to J. L.
Mackie, in id. at 106-20.
 51. FREEDEN, supra note 23, at 99.
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portant, but also prescribe some underogatable rights or provide that a right
can be limited for the protection of another right. 52
Several philosophers such as Dworkin and Martin have advanced the
use of scope drawing and the idea of weight as the way to resolve CHRs.53
According to Martin:
[t]he scope of a right specifies what the right is to (be it liberty of
conduct or avoidance of injury at the hands of others or the provi-
sion of a service of some sort) and includes any limitations that are
built into or decided upon for this right.  The weight of a right is a
determination, sometimes explicit and sometimes not, sometimes
quite exact and sometimes rather imprecise, of how it stands with
respect to other normative considerations and whether it would
give way to them, or they to it, in cases of conflict.54
According to its advocates:
[o]nce these rights have been satisfactorily balanced definitionally,
they cannot conflict with one another.  Or in the rare but foresee-
able case in which one right and another might conflict, the draft-
ing bodies could add a determinate weight to policies under each,
such that the possibility of real conflict would be wholly fore-
stalled.  Within its assigned scope and given its determinate
weight, a well-defined right simply governs all applicable situa-
tions that arise in the domain of rights.55
To apply the concept of weight to resolve CHRs is realistic and practi-
cal, but to apply the concept of weight to prevent CHRs from occurring or
to resolve all CHRs is idealistic at best.  As will be shown in the next sec-
tion, in fact, it is difficult to determine the weight of each human right in
its relation to other human rights, not to mention that the weight of each
human right may also be influenced in various scenarios by a variety of
non-right values and/or other factors.  Thus, it is very unlikely that the ex-
act weight for all human rights in various circumstances can be deter-
 52. According to Aharon Barak,
 [a] social principle (such as freedom of expression) does not have “absolute” weight.  The
weight of a social principle is always relative.  The status of a fundamental principle is al-
ways determined relative to other principles, with which it may conflict.  The weight of
freedom of speech relative to freedom of movement is different from its weight relative to
judicial integrity, both of these are different from the weight of freedom of speech relative
to reputation or privacy, and all of these are different from the weight of freedom of speech
relative to the public interest in security and safety.
 Barak, supra note 36, at 95.
 53. See, e.g., MARTIN, supra note 9.
 54. Id. at 130.
 55. Id. at 148 (emphasis added).
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mined.56  Feinberg has pointed out that “[a]ccommodation must often be
worked out after the fact of conflict rather than prevented in advance by
rules and decrees.”57  Finally, even if the weight of each human right has
been predetermined, it is not possible to guarantee that they will balance
and lead to resolution of CHRs that are cause for serious social conflict.
Martin himself has felt cautious enough to say that “we cannot assume that
principles which are appropriate to the formulation and competitive
weighting of rights, etc., even when the principles are expertly applied, can
be used to resolve all disputes concerning conflict of rights.”58  The eutha-
nasia dispute is an obvious example.
B.  Determining the Weight of Each Human Right
Difficulties with notions of weight notwithstanding, it is still valuable
to introduce the concept in terms of resolving CHRs.  In fact, the concept
of weight is perhaps the best way to deal with CHRs.  How, then, should
one determine the weight or importance of each human right?  First, de-
termination of the weight of a right requires an analysis of the right itself.
For example, the weight of a right is often in direct proportion to its strin-
gency.  As mentioned above, in a time of famine, one person’s property
right may conflict with another person’s right to life.  As the right to life
becomes more stringent, it will outweigh the property right “by the com-
mandeering of food hoards.”59  This is similar to an emergency situation
when a police car, ambulance, or fire engine has the clear right of way on a
road.
One important way to analyze a human right for determining its weight
is through Professor Waldron’s reasoning that rights “should be thought of,
not as correlative to single duties, but as generating a multiplicity of du-
ties.”60  An expanded interpretation of this view goes further to assert not
only that each right may involve multiple duties but also that each duty
may have multiple aspects.  Thus, when a CHR occurs, it may affect nei-
ther all duties of a right nor all aspects of a duty.  For example, during the
current Iraq War, freedom of the press has indisputably been overridden by
national security considerations.  The United States press, however, has
only been screened for any news and reports related to the war.  In other
 56. Martin recognizes that it is very hard to determine in advance, as well as in the abstract, when to
limit the exercise of the national security interest where it conflicts with free speech.  Id. at 134.
 57. FEINBERG, supra note 33, at 73.
 58. See MARTIN, supra note 33, at 122.
 59. BENN & PETERS, supra note 12, at 96.
 60. Waldron, supra note 11, at 503.
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words, only one aspect of the duty to protect freedom of the press has been
affected.
Because there are “successive waves of duty,” as well as multiple as-
pects of a duty, and the importance of each duty or each aspect of a duty
differs, the determination of the order of priority among them helps to de-
termine the weight of a right.  As to how to determine such an order of
priority, Waldron has pointed out:
[t]ake two duties generated by the right to free speech: the duty not
to suppress a person’s speech and the duty to punish suppressors.
On Mill’s view, the first has absolute priority over any duty to
avoid moral distress because the value of a persons’ speaking
freely is precisely the disruptive effect it has on moral compla-
cency.  The point of punishing suppressers of free speech, how-
ever, is not directly to shake up moral complacency (in the way
free speech itself does); though its aim is to vindicate and protect
an interest which does have this point, it does not in itself have this
internal relation to moral complacency.  So balancing the second
duty against a concern about moral distress may not be as miscon-
ceived as balancing the first duty against that concern would be.61
Waldron’s idea of “internal relation” is an important development in
weighing conflicting human rights.  It also proves how unrealistic it is to
establish a ranking system among human rights.  As not all the duties or
aspects of a duty will have the same moral priority, the “successive waves
of duty” make it difficult to fix any “lexical priority” among human rights.
On the other hand, the “successive waves of duty” also demonstrate the
complexity of resolving CHRs.
There is no doubt that the primary method for CHR resolution is to
determine the weight of human rights by analyzing the rights themselves.
This method, however, has its limitations.  When the conflict is between
two instances of the same right, or when the conflicting rights are both
stringent, or of the same priority, it may be necessary to consider factors
external to conflicting human rights for the weight determination.  These
factors refer first to human rights other than the conflicting rights.  For
example, H. J. McCloskey has proposed a case where there is only one
lifeguard, but twenty persons “have been swept out to sea by a rip, where
all are at risk of drowning . . . [w]hom ought he to save?”62  McCloskey
argues that “[i]n fact, most such conflicts are morally to be resolved purely
 61. Id. at 517.
 62. H. J. McCloskey, Respect for Human Moral Rights versus Maximizing Good, in UTILITY AND
RIGHTS 133 (R. G. Frey ed., 1984).
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in terms of a rights-calculus.  The rights of children, for example, may well
determine that a parent, rather than a childless person, be saved.”63  So,
when conflicting rights have the same weight or importance, we may cal-
culate the importance of human rights related to the conflicting rights to
resolve the conflict.
Even if, however, a lifeguard in such a situation is able to do a relevant
rights-calculus, it is not an easy task to make such a calculation for twenty
people.  What happens if those who have no children must take care of
their parents?  Or, what if the majority of the twenty people are parents?  In
other words, if a relevant rights-calculus cannot determine the weight of
conflicting rights, can we consider non-rights values and other fac-
tors—including utilitarian principles and practical considerations (such as
who it is relatively easier to save: lighter body weight, shorter distance,
etc.)—to determine the weight or importance of conflicting rights?  This is
a controversial issue.
For example, McCloskey is firmly against using utilitarian principles
to resolve CHRs.  He argues that to erect utilitarian considerations within
the principle of general application for resolving conflicts involving rights
to life would be to deny the basic importance of human rights.  It would be
tantamount to claiming that persons have not equal, but unequal, human
rights.  This is because it would amount to allowing utilitarian considera-
tions to override moral rights in conflict of rights situations in a way that is
seen to be morally intolerable when there is no conflict of rights, but sim-
ply a conflict between a right and a utility.64
Waldron has acknowledged that “[t]o many theorists of rights, the
utilitarian approach to conflict resolution is unpalatable.  Utilitarian rea-
soning involves trade-offs,”65 while “[t]he idea of rights has been seized on
as a way of resisting these trade-offs.”66  However, “[t]he trade-offs con-
templated by the rights theorist are unhappy enough, but probably inevita-
ble: sometimes one life must be sacrificed so that a greater number of lives
may be saved.”67  Clearly, to deny that any utilitarian principle is primary
over human rights is not to deny completely its relevance.  When rights of
equal weight conflict, to apply utilitarian principles for helping resolution
is not to recognize such principles as values that take primacy over human
rights or as means of general application for resolving CHRs.  Instead, the
 63. Id. at 134.  Even in a rights-calculus, however, the decision can be complicated and difficult to
make.  For example, if most people competing for scarce seats in a lifeboat are parents, or if the child-
less persons in the boat may have parents to take care of.
 64. Id.
 65. Waldron, supra note 11, at 507 (emphasis in original).
 66. Id. at 508.
 67. Id. at 509 (emphasis in original).  For a general discussion of using the principle of utility to
resolve the conflict of rights, see id. at 507-09.
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utilitarian principles are subsidiary considerations for helping resolve the
CHRs.
In addition to non-right values, it is also possible to apply various
practical considerations for helping resolve conflict of human rights of
equal weight.  For instance, in McCloskey’s example, it is reasonable to
take some practical considerations into account and to save first those who
are closer to a lifeguard and whose body weight is lighter, etc.  Thus, the
process of resolving CHRs is not only to analyze the weight of each con-
flicting human right, but also to consider other human rights related to
conflicting rights, and non-right values, or even practical considerations,
when rights of equal weight conflict.  As James Nickel says, “appeals to
human rights should be seen as part of moral and political argument, not as
the whole of it.  The presence of claims about human rights does not mean
that less specialized forms of moral argument cannot be invoked.”68
C.  The Uncertainty of CHR Results
Although there are many methods for resolving CHRs, nothing guar-
antees that identical results will be achieved in dealing with them.  In fact,
even applying the same method to the same CHR, the diverse nature of
human societies may still lead to different CHR results in different parts of
the world.  There are multiple reasons for this.  First, as the development of
human rights has gained momentum in recent decades, both the number
and content of human rights have been largely expanded.  This has made it
possible for more diversity in CHR results.
Second, while the number of independent states has drastically in-
creased in recent history, a world government is not within sight.  The in-
ternational mechanism for human rights protection is relatively limited.
Most CHRs have to be resolved domestically by national authorities.  Even
though the West has been actively promoting its model of political and
economic development in other parts of the world, and despite the popu-
larity of Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history” claim since the conclusion of
the Cold War,69 there are still real differences in political, economic, social,
and cultural systems among states.  Samuel Huntington has warned that the
end of the Cold War is not the “end of history” but the beginning of the
 68. JAMES W. NICKEL, MAKING SENSE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 50 (1987) (emphasis omitted).  Originally, Nickel’s
argument was to suggest that other moral or normative considerations can be invoked to override the
human rights.  Our purpose in quoting it here is to argue that when, for example, human rights of equal
weight conflict, other moral and practical considerations can be considered to add weight to one of the
conflicting human rights.
 69. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992); Francis
Fukuyama, The End of History?, 16 NAT’L INT. 3 (1989).
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clash of civilizations.70  From the CHR point of view, although a clash of
civilizations may not necessarily lead to any particular CHR, it constitutes
an important reason for the uncertainty of CHR results.  Indeed, between
countries with disparate social and cultural systems, the divergence of
CHR results may be very great.71
On the other hand, even among countries with similar political, eco-
nomic, social, and cultural systems, divergence of CHR results may occur.
For instance, in their handling of national, racial, or religious hatred and
free speech, the rules in the United States and many other countries, in-
cluding most other Western countries, are poles apart.  Many countries’
domestic laws,72 as well as international human rights treaties—such as the
 70. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD
ORDER (1996); Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations, 72 FOREIGN AFF. 22 (1993); Samuel
P. Huntington, The Coming Clash of Civilizations-or, the West Against the Rest, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
1993, at E19; Samuel P. Huntington, No Exit: The Errors of Endism, 17 NAT’L INT. 3, 10 (1989).
 71. One Chinese story from recent times quite vividly reflects the effect of cultural differences on
views of freedom.  It goes as follows:
 A Chinese girl is going to marry an Australian boy soon. They travel together to the Thou-
sand-Islands Lake in Hangzhou. The girl buys a bronze lock and asks a craftsman to carve
her name and her fiancé’s name—Wen and Kobe—on it.  Kobe watches her smiling.
 After the names are carved, Wen locks it to a handrail.  Kobe does not understand and asks
her why she is not going to take the lock back home.
 Wen answers: “This is called the lock of one heart.  It means that we will never be separated
again in the future, just as if we are locked up by this lock.”
 Kobe feels even more puzzled after her explanation.  He is unhappy after they return home
from the trip.
 Finally, Kobe raises the question: “Why lock two people up?”
 Wen replies: “Because of love!”
 Kobe then asks: “Love can restrict freedom?”
 Wen smiles: “You do not understand Chinese culture.  This is a blessing.”
 Kobe says: “So restricting freedom is a blessing?”
 One month later, just a week before the ceremony, Kobe decides to postpone the wedding.
 Wen asks him why?  Does he no longer love her?
 Kobe says he still loves her, but he cannot accept their love affair the way it has developed:
“It is threatening.  I will be locked up for the rest of my life.  How can two people be locked
up forever?”
 After listening to Kobe, Wen also feels threatened, thinking: “Thank goodness he has
revealed this.  He has never intended to love me for his whole life.”  And so, because of
mutual mistrust, they ultimately call off their engagement and wish each other farewell . . . .
 1 READER MAGAZINE 29 (2004) (in Chinese) (translation on file with the Pierce Law Review).
 72. In Germany, people can be jailed for using symbols of unconstitutional organizations.  Section
86(a) of the 1998 German Criminal Code provides that whoever domestically distributes or publicly
uses, in a meeting or in writings disseminated by him/her, symbols of unconstitutional organizations,
shall be punished with imprisonment for not more than three years or a fine.  Symbols may be, in
particular, flags, insignia, uniforms, slogans, and forms of greeting.  Strafgesetzbuch [StGB] [Penal
Code] Nov. 13, 1998, Reichsbesetzblatt [RGBl] 127, § 86(a) (use of symbols of unconstitutional orga-
nizations).  According to a Xinhua news report, German police detained about 110 persons—seventy-
four of them neo-Nazis—on August 21, 2004, when about 2,000 people, most of them Neo-Nazis,
gathered for a march in memory of Adolf Hitler’s deputy, Rudolf Hess, in the town of Wunsiedel.
Marchers were arrested for displaying outlawed Nazi symbols and for carrying weapons.  Xin Hua
News Agency, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2004-08/22/content_1854883.htm (last visited Nov. 5,
2006) (translation on file with the Pierce Law Review).
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights73 and International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion74—prohibit advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred.75  In the
United States, however, such provisions are deemed violations of the con-
stitutional protection of free speech.76  Similarly, in France, schools may
prohibit all overtly religious garb, including Muslim head scarves, but a
similar prohibition in Britain on wearing Muslim gowns was recently held
by the British Court of Appeals to be a violation of a student’s freedom to
manifest her religion or belief in public.77
The uncertainty of CHR results reflects disputes among people on
what should be the reasonable result of a CHR.  In the West, some scholars
distinguish between infringement of human rights and violation of human
rights.  For example, according to Gewirth’s terminology:
[a] right is infringed when the correlative duty is not carried out,
i.e., when the required action is not performed or the prohibited
action is performed.  A right is violated when it is infringed with-
out sufficient justification, i.e., when the required action is unjusti-
fiably not performed or the prohibited action is unjustifiably per-
formed.  And a right is overridden when it is justifiably infringed,
so that there is sufficient justification for not carrying out the cor-
relative duty, and the required action is justifiably not performed
or the prohibited action is justifiably performed.78
The problem with these detailed lexical distinctions occurs when the
same CHR produces different results, such as in the case of abortion,
which is generally allowed in China but not in Ireland.  Such distinctions
then lose their value.  Obviously, there may be different understandings as
 73. “Any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimina-
tion, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”  International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, art. 20(2), Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 172.
 74. Article 4 states:   
 (a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial su-
periority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or in-
citement to such acts against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin,
and also the provision of any assistance to racist activities, including the financing thereof.
 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 4, Dec. 21,
1965, S. EXEC. DOC. C, 95-2 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
 75. Kathleen E. Mahoney, Hate Speech: Affirmation or Contradiction of Freedom of Expression,
1996 U. ILL. L. REV. 789, 803-06 (1996).
 76. Joel R. Reidenberg, Yahoo and Democracy on the Internet, 42 JURIMETRICS J. 261, 264-65
(2002).
 77. See Sarah Lyall, British Court Says Banning Muslim Gown Violates Student’s Rights, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 3, 2005, at A13; Daniel Williams, Quiet First Day for France’s Ban on Head Scarves in
School, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 3, 2004, at A3.
 78. GEWIRTH, supra note 21, at 219.
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to when a right is justifiably infringed at different times and places.  In
different parts of the world, it is more relative than absolute as to when a
right may justifiably override another.  Such justification may even change
as a state changes its policies—for instance, when it shifts from prohibiting
abortion to allowing limited abortion.  Unless states agree on an identical
solution to a CHR, just what constitutes a rational result to that CHR is
relative.  Consider the tense relation between discrimination and affirma-
tive action as an example; there is no identical answer throughout the
world as to when the latter may constitute a type of the former.
Thus, the uncertainty of CHR results reflects a basic fact: the world is
plural and diverse.  We cannot prevent all CHRs from occurring (either in
theory or in practice), nor can we achieve identical results for all CHRs by
applying any principled method.  Principled methods can only form the
starting point for resolving CHRs.  They are not a panacea for reaching
identical results.  They assist us in analyzing concrete CHRs emerging in
different times and places.  They also tell us which factors may be used in
determining the weight of conflicting human rights.  As there are a variety
of factors that can be used for such purpose, however, and the role of each
factor in different societies and cultures may be distinct, diversity in CHR
results can thus be expected.
III. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CHR STUDY
CHR study is significant in three aspects: (1) human rights develop-
ment; (2) human rights theory; and (3) human rights practice.
A.  CHR and Human Rights Development
CHR is closely linked to the development of human rights.  To some
extent, CHR is a symbol of the development of human rights.  When the
result of a CHR differs significantly, it reveals that the development of
conflicting rights in relevant aspects is premature and has not reached the
stage where resolution of the CHR may achieve identical results every-
where.  Thus, it is not possible to determine the scope of conflicting rights
and weight definitely.  When the results of a CHR are generally identical
everywhere, the development of the conflicting rights in relevant aspects
has reached maturity.  For example, there is generally a clear line between
freedom of speech and the right to reputation.  On the other hand, it is still
controversial whether advocates of fascism are within the protected scope
of the freedom of speech or not.
The development of human rights is essentially the outcome of the de-
velopment of human society.  Today, some CHRs involve a number of
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controversies relating to important political, social, and legal issues, in-
cluding the issues of abortion and euthanasia.79  Just when, exactly, such
outstanding CHR issues will find generally accepted solutions that lead to
identical results among states will depend on the development of human-
kind itself—including its cultures, expectations, living conditions, science
and technology, reasoning, thought, etc.
Currently, these important CHR issues are still in the process of a
complicated evolution.  For example, in regard to the abortion issue, if the
opposing sides cannot reach a generally accepted compromise, the policies
of each state may still be changed along with the rise and fall of forces and
influences of both sides.  In the United States, for example, even though
the United States Supreme Court established the current abortion rules in
1973 in Roe v. Wade,80 if conservative republicans are able to hold onto
their current executive and legislative power so as to continue to change
the composition of the Supreme Court, the established case law may well
be overturned.81  It is thus arguable that the results of the CHR concerning
abortion may change, become uncertain, or even move back and forth from
one outcome to another.   Although in the long run the trend of CHR solu-
tions is gradually toward uniformity—that is, we may find generally ac-
cepted principled methods and reach identical results—currently, no matter
what methods we apply, there is no way that we will be able to readily
resolve such thorny CHRs as abortion and euthanasia, which have already
engendered serious social disputes and interference.
It is thus natural that uncertainty as to CHR results will persist for a
long time.  Here, there are two meanings implied in the word “long.”  First,
as mentioned above, some difficult existing CHRs do not have the prospect
of being quickly resolved identically.  In this sense, the specific uncertainty
about them will exist for more than a short period.  Second, even if/when
these current CHRs are resolved in the same way one day in the future,
new CHRs will be created and, thus, new uncertainty will emerge.  As a
consequence, the uncertainty in this sense will also exist for more than a
short while.  Whenever there is human rights development, there will be
 79. In the United States, the legal and political battle on euthanasia has been long and fierce.  Per-
haps the most prominent United States case concerned the fate of Terri Schiavo.  It involved battles in
both federal and state courts and legislatures.  Although the case eventually ended on March 31, 2005,
when Schiavo died peacefully after her feeding tube was removed, the debate over euthanasia did not.
For legal documents and related information concerning the Terri Schiavo case, see  Findlaw,
http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/schiavo/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2006).
 80. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).  On the issue of abortion, see ROSAMUND SCOTT, RIGHTS, DUTIES AND
THE BODY: LAW AND ETHICS OF THE MATERNAL-FETAL CONFLICT (2002).
 81. See Jim Abrams, 30 States Ready to Ban Abortion if Roe v. Wade Falls, Group Says, PRESS OF
ATLANTIC CITY, Oct. 6, 2004, at A7.
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both development of CHRs and the persistence of the uncertainty as to
some CHR results.
B.  CHR and Human Rights Theory
The theoretical significance of CHR lies first in that it supports a com-
prehensive and expansive outlook on human rights.  Debates over newly
emerging human rights, or over developments of new aspects of existing
rights, often relate to CHRs.  Only an expansive and comprehensive out-
look on human rights that does not subjectively exclude any CHR may take
these debates seriously from the perspective of human rights development
and adjust to their challenges to the traditional views of human rights.
Another theoretical significance of CHR is that it has provided a new
angle for those in academic circles to view the clash between universality
and relativism of human rights.  To perceive CHRs that are difficult to
resolve as a major obstacle to the universality of human rights overlooks
the fact that “relative” CHR results are a matter of objective reality or a
“normal” status in human rights development.  While some CHRs may end
with similar solutions (such as the SARS epidemic), others may have dif-
ferent results for a long time (such as abortion and euthanasia).  The former
undoubtedly support the principle of universality, while the latter support
relativism.  Such characteristics of CHRs require a balance between uni-
versality and relativism in human rights: that is, we should not pursue uni-
versality solely to the exclusion of objective relativism.
What is the universality principle?  According to Professor Louis Hen-
kin, “[h]uman rights . . . belong to every human being in every human so-
ciety.  They do not differ with geography or history, culture or ideology,
political or economic system, or stage of societal development.”82  If we
look carefully at the reality of CHRs, however, Henkin’s view is idealistic.
Even official United States’ behavior does not support Henkin.  For exam-
ple, as mentioned earlier, although the United States Congress has cut off
the budget for the so-called “Terrorism Information Awareness” program,
it has nonetheless allowed the technology developed under the program to
be used for foreign intelligence purposes.  As a result, the right to privacy
of foreigners and Americans is treated differently.
It should be noted that while human rights are both rules in the inter-
national human rights instruments as well as ideals in the writings of hu-
man rights theorists, they are also a complicated social reality.  On the one
hand, humankind has achieved consensus on many aspects of human rights
and, thus, human rights appear undeniably universal.  On the other hand,
 82. L. HENKIN, ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS 3 (1999).
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the uncertainty of CHR results tells us that there is lack of consensus on
many other aspects of human rights.  Differences, even fundamental differ-
ences, do exist.  Therefore, human rights also appear inevitably relative.
Consequently, universality, as either a reality or an ideal, should not
take a denial or elimination of relativism as its precondition.  On the con-
trary, for the foreseeable future, as CHR results may be either identical or
diverse, human rights may be either universal or relative as well.  In any
stage of human rights development, there will be one reality of universality
as well as one of relativism.  There will be co-existence of the two.  There-
fore, CHR includes, rather than precludes, both universality and relativism.
The CHR reality requires us to stop any futile debate of an exclusive char-
acter as to the universality and relativism controversy.
C.  CHR and Human Rights Practice
Conforming to the above analysis of the universality-relativism con-
troversy, the practical significance of CHR is that while pursuing the goal
of universal human rights, the reality of relativism—that the results of the
same CHR may differ in different nations and societies—should also be
acknowledged even when one disagrees.83  No serious human rights critics
may ignore this.  Without a good understanding of what causes a different
solution for the same CHR in other states and societies, human rights criti-
cism and censure may be unhelpful, and even counter-productive.
Of course, to acknowledge a different, albeit appropriate, resolution of
the same CHR chosen by other states and societies does not mean that
transnational criticism or expression of different views is precluded or will
be silenced.  For example, based on its consistent position, the official
newspaper of the Vatican publicly sided with Terri Schiavo’s parents and
called on the United States to keep her alive.84  This kind of criticism or
expression of opinion based on a principled position is the prerequisite of
mutual understanding.  On the other hand, conditions in a country are not
fixed forever.  When conditions change, the erstwhile best way to resolve a
CHR in that country may change as well.  For example, in recent years,
according to new situations with regard to China’s population, China has
made some adjustments to its family planning policy.85  Even if it is a good
 83. Respect for the choice of a different solution of the same CHR by other states and societies
applies to relations between all states.  For example, American scholars once called upon Europeans to
respect the United States’ position on the death penalty.  See Borut Grgic & Paola Marusich, The Death
Penalty: What Europe Doesn’t Know, INT’L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 7, 2003, at 10.
 84. See Laurie Goodstein, Schiavo Case Highlights an Alliance between Catholics and Evangeli-
cals, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at A20.
 85. For example, to cope with the so-called crisis of a “city of white hair,” the City of Shanghai on
December 31, 2003 issued the Regulations of Shanghai Municipal on Population and Family Planning.
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policy that is in question, problems may occur in its enforcement.  There-
fore, it is necessary to prompt constructive criticism and suggestions not
only toward inappropriate policies but also toward problems that emerge in
enforcing a reasonable policy.86
The practical significance of CHR is not limited to and between states
and societies.  For example, the abortion issue has long been a knot that
seems impossible to be undone among American politicians, scholars, and
citizens.  The political and legal fights as well as academic debates on this
issue seem endless.87  The most extreme form of such battles is violence
against abortion clinics and the murder of abortion doctors and clinic
workers.88  For the human rights movement, to witness such violence and
killing in a controversy involving a CHR is most unfortunate.
IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Whether it is the bloody killing of abortion doctors and clinic workers;
the sad yet true-to-life climactic scene in the movie Titanic; the excruciat-
ing challenges in attempting to carry out euthanasia; or the confusion
brought about by numerous other CHRs; mankind has no alternative but to
face such difficult situations head on in daily life.  Past, present, and future
CHRs will always play an integral role in human rights evolution.  While
they present ancient issues, their revelation has both current and futuristic
aspects.  It will continue to be a long-term task for human society to treat
See Regulations of Shanghai Municipal on Population and Family Planning, Dec. 31, 2003, available
at http://www.popinfo.gov.cn/popinfo/pop_doczcwd.nsf/v_by4id/3161352475803E4D48256FC4002E
EFFC.  The new regulations, effective April 15, 2004, drop a mandatory four-year interval before
having a second child, as required by the former law, and extend people eligible for a second child to
include those with a registered permanent address in the city (not just in the countryside) as well as
remarried couples.  Id.; see also So, You Want a Second Child?, XINHUANET, Sep. 28, 2004, available
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/200409/28/content_2033874.htm.  For an account of the recent
relaxation of China’s family planning policy, see Jonathan Watts, Shanghai Eases China’s One-Child
Rule, GUARDIAN, Apr. 14, 2004, at 14.
 86. See, e.g., Gao Huiqing, Revamping Population Policy, CHINA BUS. WEEKLY, Aug. 3, 2004,
available at http://www2.chinadaily.com.cn/chinagate/doc/2004-08/03/content_357294.htm; Joseph
Kahn, China’s Time Bomb: The Most Populous Nation Faces a Population Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, May
30, 2004, at D1; Philip P. Pan, Who Controls the Family? Blind Activist Leads Peasants in Legal
Challenge To Abuses of China’s Population-Growth Policy, WASH. POST, Aug. 27, 2005, at A1.
 87. Anti-abortion organizations were actively involved in the Terri Schiavo case.  American pro-life
activists view the case as “an issue aligned with their beliefs” and see assisted suicide as a “moral and
religious issue of overriding importance.”  The Schiavo case showed that “social conservatives were as
consumed with the end of life as they were with life in the womb.”  See Peter Wallsten, How the Pri-
vate Became Political, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2005, at A1.
 88. For an account and analysis of America’s radical anti-abortion movement, see Ben Ehrenreich,
Operation Miscue: How Legal Problems, Cultural Shifts and Internal Turmoil Muffled America’s
Radical Anti-Abortion Movement, and Why the Battle Isn’t Over, L.A. WEEKLY, Apr. 11, 2002, avail-
able at http://www.laweekly.com/ ink/02/20/cover-ehrenreich.php.
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CHR issues seriously, deal with them rationally, and resolve cases involv-
ing them appropriately.
